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Staff behaviour is increasingly understood to be an important 
determinant of an organisations’ vulnerability to information 
security breaches.  In parallel to the HCI and CSCW literature, 
models drawn from cognitive and health psychology have 
suggested a number of mental variables that predict staff response 
to security threats. This study began with these models, but engaged 
in a broader, discovery-orientated, qualitative investigation of how 
these variables were experienced, interacted subjectively, and what 
further variables might be of relevance.  We conducted in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews consisting of open and closed questions 
with staff from a financial services institution under conditions of 
strict anonymity.  Results include a number of findings such as a 
possible association between highly visible security procedures and 
low perceptions of vulnerability leading to poor security practices.  
We also found self-efficacy was a strong determinant of staff 
sharing stories of negative experiences and variances in the number 
of non-relevant emails that they process.  These findings lead to a 
richer, deeper understanding of staff experiences in relation to 
information security and phishing. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The roles that staff play in information security (IS) breaches have, 
of late, become increasingly recognised as important determinants 
of an organisation’s IS defence posture.  While the exact 
classification of breach types remains controversial, reports such as  
IBM’s 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index claim that ‘human 
error’ was implicated in over 95% of significant data breaches of 
their systems [1].  As such, it is becoming apparent that purely 
technical solutions to information security will not be sufficient to 
address the growing threat to our networks and data posed by cyber 
criminals and hostile entities.   
There are a number of much discussed user failures to comply with 
IS policies that have shown to be largely explicable using 
investigations based around user-education and the usability-
security trade-off.  Examples include; the difficulties in complying 
with password policies [2, 3], giving away too much personal 
information when not required [4], and ignoring warning messages 
when engaging in unsafe behaviour [5].  As these examples 
suggest, this body of work is typically based on ‘user studies’ where 
the dependent variables are either behavioural, or subjective 
observations of the behaviours in question.   This body of literature 
also typically focusses on raising user awareness of cyber threats, 
with the assumption that knowledge will allow people to recognise 
and deal with attacks.  However, a further class of problems 
requires a different investigative lens.  Cyber attackers are now 
recognised as understanding and leveraging the inherent cognitive 
biases and weaknesses of the human information processing system 
[6, 7], enabling them to bypass effortful, deep information 
processing by the user [8].  This is particularly evident in phishing 
attacks, which consist of generic, non-targeted emails, distributed 
widely, that attempt to entice the user to click on a link or open an 
attachment leading to a malware infection or security credentials 
being revealed to the attacker.  These types of exploits are crafted 
with increasing sophistication aimed at bypassing conscious 
processing of the victim and eliciting more automatic behaviours 
characterised by shallow information processing and as such these 
methods require new approaches to mitigate [9].  In the face of 
these kinds of attacks, analyses based on more behavioural methods 
are likely to fall short, explication requiring a deeper engagement 
with the cognitive processes that staff experience when facing 
threats.  In this paper we discuss cognitive models that include 
constructs such as threat Self-Efficacy (SE) and perceived 
Vulnerability (V). These variables, in particular, have been shown 
to predict users deploying protective behaviours to a greater extent 
than knowledge alone [10, 11].  Knowledge is now seen as 
necessary, but not sufficient to arm users against attackers. 
This paper aims to extend the understanding of the human end-user 
within the IS landscape, specifically seeking to understand the 
underlying, presumably causative, cognitive variables that drive 
these behaviours.  This work draws on the literature of cognitive 
psychology and aims to extend the approaches adopted by the HCI 
and CSCW community.  Our study involved the staff of a major 
financial services institution in Australia and New Zealand.  The 
study was aimed principally at understanding factors implicated in 
victimisation via phishing attacks, but had as a secondary objective 
to understand the challenges that staff faced in relation to IS more 
generally.  We were interested in the following research questions:  
 What cognitive variables may be implicated in staff’s 
behaviour in relation to phishing emails? 
 How do staff experience information security within the 
organisation and how does this differ from their perceptions 
at home? 
 What environmental and organisational factors affect staff 
behaviour in relation to phishing attacks and information 
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After carrying out our study and analysing the results, we 
established a number of emergent themes from the data.  These 
themes are detailed individually in the results section of this work 
and then the implications are considered and additional context is 
provided in the discussion section.  Many of the themes, such as 
staff’s low feelings of vulnerability, variable proportions of non-
relevant emails and willingness to share victimisation experiences 
only if they have high self-efficacy, immediately suggest further 
working hypotheses, the primary of which are discussed in the 
future work section. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Differing approaches to research in cyber security have resulted in 
subtly, but fundamentally different bodies of literature around the 
subject.  Each has its own characteristics such as assumptions, 
methods, and investigative lenses.  One body of work, emerging 
largely from the HCI and CSCW domain, has provided us with a 
rich picture of the behavioural characteristics of users in response 
to IS challenges.  Acquisiti et al. [4] provided an excellent overview 
of the way users make poor decisions about privacy.  Dhamaja et 
al. [12] demonstrated the inability of people to detect well-crafted 
phishing emails, even in ideal conditions, and noted the poor 
response to security indicators such as status bar warnings.  And 
finally users have also been shown to frequently disclose more 
information on-line than they need to [13], and are often willing to 
sacrifice privacy for remarkably small rewards [14].  Overall the 
picture built up by this research is concerning since it indicates that 
people are extremely vulnerable to cyber attacks.  
Much, but not all, of this work is based on an underlying 
assumption that educating the user will fix the problem.  The core 
issue is often understood to be ‘how do we help users learn more 
about security so that they can make better decisions’.  Influential 
papers such as that by Kumaraguru et al. [15] are focussed almost 
entirely on the education issue and the dependent variables of 
interest in the study are all based around the acquisition, retention, 
and transfer of knowledge. 
Arising from this standpoint, an entire commercial ecosystem has 
emerged offering to address the ‘human problem’ of cyber security 
purely through training and education campaigns.  However these 
approaches are rapidly approaching the point of diminishing 
returns, where security professionals are frustrated by the 
persistence of poor user IS behaviour leading some authors to 
suggest that human-based solutions are not feasible and that 
technical solutions are the only way to effectively safeguard 
systems from attackers [16]. 
However, another body of cyber security research has concerned 
itself more with understanding the underlying cognitive variables, 
or mental constructs, underpinning the behaviours of interest.  This 
vein of research has its roots in both health psychology and 
cognitive psychology and promises to extend the efficacy of 
mitigation methods beyond that offered by simple education.  For 
example, Samaya et al. [10] recently showed, in an excellently 
designed study of 3,500 participants across seven countries, that 
user self-confidence in being able to respond to security threats was 
a more than four times larger predictor of their measure of good 
cyber security behaviour, than was knowledge of cyber security 
threats.  Findings such as this, that identify the cognitive constructs 
that drive behavioural models, promise to be able to extend the 
effectiveness of mitigation strategies beyond the limitations of 
current ‘education and training’ approaches. 
Models originally based in health psychology [17] are remarkably 
suited for deployment in the IS domain since the environments are 
in many ways analogous.  Both IS and health involve individual 
behaviour, in situations of uncertainty and in response to threats 
which are often poorly understood, where costs can often be 
temporally far removed and not deemed likely, and where 
compliance with desired protocols (often referred to as response 
costs) is either arduous, or not immediately desirable.  According 
to these models, the challenge of eating well and exercising 
regularly is almost perfectly analogous to deploying strong and 
different passwords on every system you use. 
Many of these current psychological models of behaviour in 
response to threats are derived to some degree from the hugely 
influential Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) [18].  This model 
proposes that beliefs about a behaviour and evaluations of the 
outcome of a behaviour result in attitudes towards the behaviour, 
and that social influences and motivation result in subjective norms.  
These two constructs; attitude towards the behaviour and subjective 
norms, then interact to result in behavioural intention, which in turn 
predicts the behaviour itself.  Ajzen’s later reformulation of the 
model into the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) [19] involved 
the addition of variables that accounted for a person’s own beliefs 
about their ability to carry out the behaviours in question.  Referred 
to as perceived behavioural control and later disambiguated further 
to variables such as locus of control [20], self-efficacy [17, 21] and 
response-efficacy [22], these variables have a long history of being 
shown to be significant predictors of behavioural intentions.  These 
variables are also deployed in contemporary models of protective 
behaviour such as the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [23].  
In short, the constructs encompassed in perceived behavioural 
control suggest that people are unlikely to attempt to engage in a 
behaviour if they think that they will not be able to carry out the 
behaviour in question. Constructs such as these are central to our 
investigations and are discussed in more detail in the discussion 
section of this paper. 
Another prominent model emerging from health psychology 
literature is Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [11] 
which was derived from ideas about people’s response to fear, and 
suggested that encountering a communication that induced fear 
would induce a threat appraisal process which, mediated by 
variables such as response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
costs, would result in protection motivation leading to either an 
adaptive or maladaptive response to the threat.   
More recently still, in the cognitive domain, dual route models of 
information processing such as the Heuristic Systematic Model 
(HSM) have begun to be applied specifically to the problem of 
phishing victimisation with notable successes in predicting user 
behaviour [9, 24].  Dual Route models suggest that users often 
engage in little elaborative, deep (‘system 2’) information 
processing when scanning emails, and rely instead of more shallow 
(system 1) information processing based on simple heuristics such 
as calls to authority, urgency cues and social proof [25] to make 
fast decisions about whether to respond or not [8].  These models 
suggest that regardless of a users’ knowledge of threats, when 
scanning an inbox for messages to respond to, users often engage 
in very shallow cognitive processing of email cues such as sender 
and subject line, meaning that they are not deploying the knowledge 
that they have about these cues.  This results in important signals 
such as malformed email addresses (type-jacking) escaping 
attention.  According to these theories, in this low level of cognitive 
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engagement with the task, people are more likely to respond to 
simple heuristic rules of thumb such as ‘this email is marked as 
urgent’ and ‘Oh this is a reputable brand – it must be ok’ and are 
therefore enticed to click on emails that would, if given more 
thought, appear suspicious. 
3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical standpoint from which 
this research was carried out. 
We sought to set out from the previously established findings but 
engage in a more discovery-orientated investigation.  Thus we 
aimed at uncovering the ‘unknown unknowns’ of this particular 
space and thereby be better equipped to later select specific models 
to apply – or develop new models altogether. As such, we deployed 
qualitative methods, with the aim of gaining insight into the 
cognitions, work contexts, motivations, normative influences, and 
everyday practices of staff as they experience phishing attempts. 
Although our approach was not a full implementation of grounded 
theory, we deployed many of the techniques prescribed by this 
method, seeking knowledge from the ground-up and asking 
questions with varying degrees of specificity in order to probe 
specific areas of interest. 
Qualitative methods are useful for identifying new and 
undiscovered phenomena, providing deeper insights into user 
experiences than quantitative measures can provide, may be 
transferable to populations equivalent to the sample group and can 
uncover themes that may be later tested with more quantitative 
approaches [26].  Furthermore, the depth of detail and nuanced, 
semantic-based responses provide a richer, deeper understanding of 
the problem-space than offered by higher-n quantitative studies 
with less time devoted to each subject [27]. 
In this, our research was successful in that it uncovered evidence of 
both a number of widely reported dynamics and phenomena in the 
field, as well as promising results that were novel or even 
contradicted prevailing knowledge in the literature.   
4. INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT 
Starting out from the variables deployed by the theories above, we 
developed a 38-item questionnaire with questions grouped by 
topics: Knowledge, Attitudes, History, Practices, Contexts and 
Identity (see appendix A for the complete instrument).  Since we 
sought to extend our investigation beyond the known, specific 
constructs of the models in question, we formulated many open 
questions designed to elicit non-structured, wide-ranging 
responses.  An overview of the literature consulted in the process 
of developing the questions for each topic is included below. 
4.1 Knowledge 
Individuals’ knowledge of cyber security threats as well as 
computer literacy and expertise have been proposed as important 
determinants of protective behaviours.  Furthermore, specific 
variables such as threat awareness and countermeasure awareness 
have been posited as predictors of IS policy compliance [17].  
However, as Stephanou showed [28], while education/training 
campaigns have measurable impact on staff knowledge of the 
desired behaviours, they are not necessarily correlated with actual 
subsequent behaviour suggesting that education is necessary but 
not sufficient to mitigate victimisation.  As such, the questions 
included in the Knowledge topic were designed to gauge the depths 
of people’s understanding of the domain generally, as well as elicit 
more emotional and relational perceptions of their role and 
interactions with others in this context.  We wanted to understand 
how participants thought of and spoke about IS and how it affected 
them in their everyday work lives.  Therefore we developed five 
questions (Q1,Q1A-D, see Appendix A) and grouped these under 
the Knowledge topic.  These were deliberately broad, open 
questions, designed to elicit conceptions about security in the most 
general terms possible and in ways that were most cognitively 
available and important to participants.  Q1-B was designed to elicit 
conceptions around who were the actors in the IS space – both 
within the organisation and outside – to try to understand whom 
participants interacted with and had relationships with in relation to 
the subject. 
4.2 Attitudes 
Ever since La Pierre showed that when questions about attitudes 
are posed broadly they are poor predictors of specific behaviours 
[29] attitudes have long been known to have a complicated 
relationship with behaviour.  As such we set out to understand how 
the most commonly implicated variables in IS behavioural models 
of attitudes were experienced by staff and what kind of situational 
factors fed into these variables.  We were also interested in people’s 
value systems and how ideas about the importance of IS impacted 
on their intention to comply with mandated security protocols. 
Perceptions of vulnerability have been found to be important 
predictors of people engaging in protective behaviours in a number 
of models such as the PMT [30].  Perceptions of fear are also central 
to the threat appraisal process described in this model [11, 31].  
Thus we were specifically interested in ideas around vulnerability 
and fear and formulated questions Q2 to Q4B in a manner that 
illuminated the contexts in which they are evoked, and categorised 
these as belonging to the ‘Attitudes’ Topic. 
4.3 History 
We were interested in the effects of previous phishing or fraud 
victimisation on subsequent behaviour and attitudes.  Research into 
related constructs such as ‘threat awareness’ and ‘domain 
knowledge’ has yielded mixed results.  Wang et al. [32] showed 
that prior ‘scam knowledge’ decreases attention to ‘visceral 
triggers’ and increases attention to deceptive elements in fraudulent 
emails.  However Vishwanath et al. [33], deploying a dual process 
model of information processing, found that domain specific 
knowledge (a construct including experience and exposure) 
significantly predicted elaboration likelihood (deeper processing of 
information according to dual route theories) in only one half of a 
split-half test population and the relationship was therefore only 
partially supported.  However, in both these cases experience was 
not directly related to previous victimisation and instead consisted 
of education and exposure to information without the negative 
outcomes associated with actual victimisation.  On other hand, 
Böhme et al. [34] found that experience with e-commerce fraud was 
likely to reduce subsequent on-line purchasing behaviours, but that 
as a predictor, the effect size was less than ‘general concerns’ and 
‘personal concerns’.  In a result that may explain some of the 
variance in findings above, Yu [35] found that victimisation 
experience significantly affected subsequent fear of cybercrime for 
cyber bullying, digital piracy and computer viruses – but not for on-
line scams, suggesting that post-incident fear perceptions are 
dependent on the nature of the crime itself.   
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In light of these seemingly variable findings, we developed a 
number of questions aimed at understanding participants’ real 
world experience with phishing victimisation and cyber-fraud and 
how these experiences affected their subsequent and ongoing 
practices and cognitions around IS (Q5-Q12). 
4.4 Practices 
We were also interested in staff’s experiential relationship with 
specific known challenges for IS.  The questions in this topic were 
designed to elicit discussion on behaviours around passwords, use 
of free Wi-Fi, and then, in more detail; email practices (Q13-Q17).  
The relationship between system usability and restrictive security 
procedures has been much discussed.  For example Post and Kagan 
[36] showed that increased requirements around the complexity and 
diversity in user-generated passwords resulted in ever increasing 
cognitive demands often leading to more risky behaviours (such as 
writing passwords down).  This particular security-usability trade-
off is also highly explicable to users and as such, we wanted to 
understand both their practices and attitudes towards password use 
as a proxy for more general behaviour around IS. 
Since the financial institution involved in our study had a long-
standing and significant investment in IS education including an 
extensive training program, an information portal, phishing drills, 
and awareness events we were also interested in staff awareness of 
and response to these engagements (Q18-22). 
There has also been discussion about what educational formats are 
most effective at engaging staff [37] – so we asked about both staff 
appetite for more learning – and their ideal format for educational 
materials (Q23). 
4.5 Contexts 
Behaviour does not occur in a vacuum, and as such we were 
interested in gaining insight into the environmental and 
organisational factors that impact on the work practices associated 
with phishing victimisation.   Much of this section was specifically 
designed to elicit information about staff practices in relation to 
email as the primary vector for phishing attacks. 
Dual route models of information processing suggest that users 
typically engage in little elaborative information processing when 
scanning emails, and rely instead of more shallow evaluations 
based on heuristics such as calls to authority, urgency cues and 
social proof to make fast decisions about responding [3, 16].  
Importantly these attentional-based theories suggest that education 
is unlikely to be sufficient to curb risky behaviour if the user never 
engages their implicit knowledge of the subject matter in order to 
evaluate threats.  These attentional models also suggest that a new 
range of variables – such as workload, attentional resources and 
task demands (as well as individual differences such as need for 
cognition [8]) are important determinants of phishing victimisation.  
Mark et al. [38] showed that some email usage patterns result in 
users feeling cognitively overloaded and stressed.  This, in 
conjunction with the finding by Vishwanath et al.  [33] that the 
number of emails that users engage with daily (email load) 
significantly increased the likelihood of falling for phishing attacks, 
suggest that the sheer volume of emails people respond to provides 
significant challenges to people’s available cognitive resources to 
evaluate threats.  Mark et al. also noted different patterns of 
behaviour around responding to emails, such as users who process 
in ‘batches’ at pre-determined times, to those who check their inbox 
constantly throughout the day, and those who respond to 
notifications in real-time.  The ramifications of these different 
patterns of email interaction on phishing responses has yet to be 
investigated so we formulated Questions 24-29 in order to better 
understand staff behaviours in this area.  
Additionally, two much discussed variables in IS behaviour are 
those relating to the punitive measures that organisations deploy in 
response to poor staff security behaviour, specifically perceived 
certainty of sanctions and perceived sanction severity.  These 
variables are controversial since while prevailing thought within 
the criminologist domain suggests that increasing these variables 
leads to more desired behaviours [39] – other studies have shown 
that they are only weakly predictive [29], particularly when there 
are avenues to neutralise the effects of their non-compliance [41]. 
Furthermore, we were also interested in the normative environment 
in which participants existed and informational and cultural 
influences on staff attitudes.  Dodge et al. [42] amongst many other 
has shown that staff who have leaders that espouse IS protocols and 
lead by example are more likely to adopt good practices 
themselves.  Flores et al. [43] showed that both the variables of 
transformation leadership (where leaders involve subordinates in 
decision making and driving change) and IS culture were both 
significant predictors of IS awareness which in turn had significant 
effects on intrinsic beliefs and then intentions.  In terms of social 
norms and peer influence, Ifinedo [21] deployed Social Bond 
Theory to show that the four constructs of attachment (to an 
organisations values), commitment (to an organisations goals), 
involvement (in an organisations goals) and personal norms were 
all significant predictors of subjective norms and that subjective 
norms had a positive effect on attitudes towards IS policy 
compliance.  As such, we asked a number of questions (Q31A-C, 
Q32A-C) about where people learnt about IS from, and then also 
about whether they talked about, learnt from or thought of as valued 
by both peers and managers.   
4.6 Identity 
In models derived from Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, as 
well as later variants such as the PMT, various elements of a 
person’s ideas about their selves, such as locus of control, self-
efficacy and response efficacy have been shown to be important 
predictors of behaviour [44].  Furthermore, motivation has been 
shown to have a causal relationship with elaborative processing, as 
expressed in more attention-based models such as the HSM.  
However, in a finding that poses challenges for motivational-based 
models, Floyd et al. [23] showed evidence that that self-efficacy 
was not correlated with elaboration likelihood in evaluating 
phishing emails whereas level of involvement was.   
Therefore, in addition to the ideas about subjective norms which 
we included in the contexts section above, in this subset of 
questions (Q33-Q38) we wanted to understand how staff engaged 
with their work practices in ways that may be affected by such 
variables such as self-efficacy, response-efficacy, responsibility 
and locus of control. 
5. METHOD 
5.1 Participants 
18 staff situated in Australia (4) and New Zealand (14) from a 
major financial services institution, took part in the study (8 female, 
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10 male).  Staff were recruited via emails sent to a cross section of 
staff.  Some organic recruitment also took place as staff began to 
forward the invitation to colleagues.  Staff were offered the 
opportunity to win double movies passes as recompense for 
participation, were instructed as to the anonymity protocols 
involved and informed of the voluntary nature of the experiment 
via the automated, sign-up web service provided by the bank.  
Participation consent, and consent for the experimenters making a 
recording was provided at the beginning of the interview session.  
The functional roles of the participants are listed in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Functional roles of participants of the study. 
Position Category Number of participants 
Customer services, support 
and sales 
4 
Technical + Operations 8 
Managers 2 
Finance and Risk 4 
5.2 Apparatus 
The 38-item questionnaire had questions grouped by topics: 
Knowledge, Attitudes, History, Practices, Contexts and Identity 
(see appendix A for the complete instrument).  Many questions 
were open and designed to elicit extensive, wide-ranging responses.  
Since we had limited time (30 minutes per interview), insufficient 
to administer all questions, a randomly selected subset of topics was 
differentially applied to each participant – with the exception of 
Knowledge questions – which were applied to all participants.  
Coverage of topics across participants is detailed in table 2.  As 
many topics were applied to each participant as time permitted.  
Some participants offered much more detailed, and therefore time-
consuming responses than others, leading to an uneven number of 
topics covered by different participants. 
5.3 Iteration 
After the first two days of interviews, consisting of 12 participants, 
an initial analysis of responses was made to determine emergent 
themes.  Based on this analysis, seven additional questions (Q201-
207) were developed and then were administered to the remaining 
participants during the second interview session, referred to as 
‘round two’.  These questions were interleaved with the existing 
questions according to their topic.  The responses arising from these 
questions are discussed in the results section according to the 
category that gave rise to each question. 
5.4 Procedure 
All interviews were carried out remotely with participants ‘dialling 
in’ to a conference call from their premises.  The interviewers 
remained at Data61 premises and were visible via webcam for the 
first four interviews – but then, after finding that this was of limited 
utility, for all subsequent interviews only audio was used.  
Participants only provided audio and were never visible to the 
interviewers.  Throughout the recruitment process, participant 
anonymity was stressed, and owing to the protocols we deployed, 
participants were only known to the interviewers by their ‘Made-
up’ ID provided by the bank.  This approach seemed to reassure 
interviewees, and they appeared to speak freely and without 
evidence of much social desirability bias present in their responses.   
5.5 Coding  
Interviews were transcribed in full by various authors, with one 
interview being lost owing to a failure of audio recording 
equipment.  For this participant detailed interviewer notes were 
used for analysis.  All coding was then carried out by the main 
author, with frequent access to the original recordings for 
clarification.  Coding began with categories suggested by the 
cognitive variables in related work as detailed in sections 3 and 4.  
Additional categories were then developed from the data itself as 
analysis progressed and ones where known variables did not yield 
fruitful new information were abandoned. For each category 
identified, the entire body of transcripts was then re-analysed for 
additional data pertaining to the category uncovered.  Further 
distinctions were made within categories as the data suggested 
leading in some cases to new questions being developed and 
deployed in round two of interviews.  Eventually a two level 
taxonomy of findings was established consisting of general 
categories of responses with sub-themes.  Through this process, we 
achieved saturation, i.e.: a state where little fresh information 
emerges from subsequent interviews because all the main themes 
have been uncovered, within our 18 participants [27]. 






















































































P1 45-54 M 6 Yes P   Yes   
P2 45-54 M 10 Yes Yes Yes P Yes Yes  
P3 35-44 M 6 Yes Yes P Yes  Yes  
P4 35-44 F 16 Yes P  P  P  
P5 35-44 F 8 Yes Yes  P Yes   
P6 35-44 M 10 Yes   Yes  Yes  
P7 35-44 F 20 Yes Yes   P Yes  
P8 35-44 M 2 Yes   Yes Yes   
P9 35-44 F 16 Yes Yes P Yes Yes Yes  
P10 20-24 M 2 Yes Yes P Yes  P  
P11 25-34 F 7 Yes  P P    
P12 25-34 M 1 Yes Yes   Yes   
P13 35-44 F 5 Yes Yes Yes P Yes Yes Yes 
P14 45-54 F 1 Yes Yes Yes P Yes Yes Yes 
P15 35-44 F 14 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P16 45-54 M 3 Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
P17 25-34 M 10 Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
P18 >64 M 3 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Note: P = Partial coverage of questions for this topic. 
6. RESULTS 
Results are presented in three categories, organised by the themes 
emerging from the interviews themselves: information, education 
and knowledge sharing; experience of email practices; perceptions 
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of threat, vulnerability and responsibility.  Note that these 
categories and themes arise from the data itself and are therefore 
not directly related to the topics in which the questions were 
originally grouped. 
6.1 Information, education and knowledge 
sharing 
6.1.1 Passive learning is taking place, but active 
learning needs to be facilitated 
We asked several questions designed to establish staff’s sources of 
information about IS and their engagement with and opinions of 
those sources of information (Q18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 31A, 
31B).  We found a wide variety of practices around learning about 
IS including: 
 Learning at specific training events 
 As part of their job requirements (noted for staff in more 
technical and IT related positions). 
 The bank’s intranet. 
 Weekly email bulletins. 
 Monthly email bulletins. 
 Outside sources of information such as IS websites and 
third party company security warnings. 
Staff generally stated that they received information about IS and 
viewed this information in a positive light and as a necessary part 
of their responsibilities within the bank (see more detail on this in 
section 6.3.5). 
But importantly, it should be noted that most of the modes of 
education staff referenced are passive – and when asked about 
where staff would go if they had questions about IS issues – there 
was a high degree of uncertainty. 
“I don't even know if we've got that kind of stuff on our 
website.”   P6 
“I said before I don't think we have specific training on cyber 
crime. There's no specific modules around it…” P7 
“I would probably go to <name of internal corporate intranet - 
redacted>.  And I would search for security and probably email 
them or call them and let them know something that had 
happened, and if they're not the right person then ideally they 
help you find who the right person is.” P14 
6.1.2 Happy to scan an information email for new 
knowledge 
While asking participants about their sources of information on IS 
we uncovered a recurring pattern of usage of information received 
via email bulletins.  Participants, at all levels of security awareness, 
expressed positivity about receiving periodic information about IS.  
When prompted to elaborate on this engagement many responses 
were characterised by the idea of there not necessarily being much 
new in the content, but being willing to scan over the information 
to search for any new pieces of information.   
“…yeah it's definitely good reminders… It's timely, I don't think 
it's overwhelming…” P5 
“…there's nothing I would read word for word, but I would 
definitely scan my eyes over it.” P13 
“I would say it's mostly a repeat. I can see what they're trying 
to do, and that, the intent of the bank as an organisation needs 
to insure that all of the staff understands the whole deal. So, the 
information that comes to where I am is fairly regular.” P16 
This finding is an encouraging indicator that staff value periodic 
information provided by their employer and furthermore have 
developed nuanced and agentic levels of engagement with these 
channels to extract information that they see as pertinent to them. 
 
6.1.3 How would people like their information 
presented?  Short, snappy and based on real-life 
scenarios 
Participants experience with information delivery was of particular 
interest to us so Q23 was specifically crafted to uncover ideas about 
preferred format of IS information and training.  While short videos 
were mentioned occasionally, most respondents expressed a clear 
preference for text-based communication and brevity was seen as 
an important requirement.   
Furthermore, a number of respondents all converged on a single 
underlying theme – the desire for education based on user 
experiences, outcomes and specific mitigation techniques. 
“When you’re building something around info security training 
if it's a real life thing that actually happened.” P3 
“I think something that is a brief short and sharp one or two 
reduced snippet sort of a thing which says look: 'here is what 
happens if you did this and here is how you could avoid that'.” 
P8 
“But I would really, really ask for something very brief.  I feel 
as if people just LOVE filling up a page with words.  And I think 
bullet points.  Can't go past a bullet point.” P13 
Participant responses indicated a set of highly specific criteria for 
information consumption, characterised by ideas of brevity and the 
desire for information that is tied to their own personal experiences 
and practices. 
6.1.4 Communicating after a bad event – The 
implications of prior experience 
We asked participants about their previous experience with both 
phishing email victimisation and on-line crime more generally.  We 
were interested in how staff experienced these incidents and what 
meanings they ascribed to the events and then further how it shaped 
their ongoing behaviours. (Q6-Q10).  In analysing the resultant 
responses, we noted that responses to Q10 (‘Did you tell anyone 
about it?’) varied in what appeared to be a systemic manner that fell 
into two distinct groups of responses.    
Group 1:  
Participants reported telling friends and colleagues about a 
negative IS incident following the fact.  In all cases, the stated 
motivation was to assist others in avoiding the same problem 
that they experienced.  Interestingly in all cases where 
participants reported broadcasting their negative experience, 
they also demonstrated high levels of technical awareness and 
rated themselves as highly competent with computers.   
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“I certainly did.  I spoke to my colleagues, my friends, sort of 
tried to make sure that people are not getting into that.” P8 
“Uhh yeah I did tell my colleagues about it, yes. ” P17 
Group 2: 
Participants suggested that they did not want to tell anyone 
about their experience and specifically thought that it would 
reflect badly on them.  In these cases, participants saw 
themselves as being less technically adept. 
“I may not umm more so if people think ‘how dumb she is’ 
<laughs>” P15 
“Oh definitely - I was definitely embarrassed.  A sense of 'how 
did I not see that?” P6 
6.2 Experience of email practices 
6.2.1 Scanning your inbox – where mistakes happen. 
When asked about the quantity of emails employees received in a 
given day, participants volunteered a wide variety of responses 
ranging from ‘10’ to ‘thousands’.   However, despite this variety a 
common theme emerged of the process of quickly ‘scanning’ their 
mailbox for important items in order to identify items that were 
important or time sensitive.   
“You tend to - where you might have glanced at an email before 
and read a few sentences from the subject heading - to know a 
bit more before you make that judgement - when it's busy and 
you're stressed - you look at the subject header and you look at 
the 'to' box and if you're not in there and if you’re not called 
out in the subject as action - you don't look at it.” P6 
“So if it's someone I'm currently working with I'll read it 
straight away.  If it's like - a general email to a lot of people - 
then I'll be like 'Well do I have time?  Nope - I'll look at it 
later'.” P2 
“I would quickly look at who sent it and the content - oh not the 
content - the subject line and determine whether it's worth me 
looking at it straight away then I'll flag emails myself to what 
priority.” P5 
This finding on its own may not be significant, but when coupled 
with both the findings about the amount of non-relevant emails 
(section 6.2.2) and staff’s periodic variance in workload (section 
6.2.3) – this may be an indication of circumstances when people’s 
cognitive processing of emails is more shallow during busy work 
periods and are therefore more likely to click harmful links and 
attachments. 
6.2.2 Some people receive high volumes of non-
relevant content 
Email practices are obviously a primary consideration when 
investigating staff behaviour in response to phishing attacks.  We 
asked a number of questions designed to elicit staff experiences 
around practices and contexts when processing incoming emails – 
both at work and at home (Q15-Q17, Q24-Q29, Q35, Q38).  During 
the initial analysis of session one interviews, we noted a consistent 
theme emerging where participants would nominate a number of 
emails that they would receive each day, but then would later 
modify that amount in respect to how many they thought were 
actually relevant to them.  As a result we added Q207 (‘Do you get 
a lot of emails that aren’t really relevant to you?  Or are trivial?’) 
to the interviews for participants in session two. 
We uncovered that some, but not all, participants talked about 
having to deal with large numbers of emails that were not 
particularly relevant to them, or were trivial.  These included: 
 FYI emails where people were generating a paper trail in 
order to share responsibility or visibility for a decision or 
process, but again no action was required of the recipient. 
 Spam (non-phishing) emails. 
 Magazines and informational emails (presumably via 
subscription). 
 ‘Marketing’ and promotional emails (presumably un-invited 
and as a result of submitting user details to an external 
party). 
“Umm yeah a lot of the emails are sort of marketing emails.” 
P17 
“Definitely.  … you'd get in any given day where you would 
skim read it and say 'ok, great, fine, filed'.” P6 
6.2.3 Periodic variations in workload 
Participants were asked several questions focussed around email 
practices and time pressure at work (Q24 - Q29).  After round one 
of interviews, initial analysis showed that many participants found 
it difficult to respond to these questions systematically because of 
the variation in their workload over time.   We therefore developed 
two additional questions (Q201, Q203) that were asked of 
participants in session two interviews, specifically aimed at 
exploring this phenomenon. 
We found that while a few described their positions as being 
reasonably stable in terms of workload and time pressure, others 
indicated a large amount of ‘seasonal’ variation of these attributes. 
“It can get crazy busy, it can get insanely busy and at other 
times - it can be quite relaxed.” P2 
“Our days are very umm… no single day is the same.” P5 
“There are phases when it's very, very busy and you definitely 
do feel the pressure.  But that phase comes once every few 
weeks.  And then it <unintelligible> goes back to normal where 
it's not so much of a time pressure. … I think my behaviour 
changes significantly at that point in time, or during those 
phases.” P8 
Furthermore, when we probed deeper and asked participants to 
expand on their email practices during these different periods – 
many staff stated that they thought these would vary considerably 
according to the workload at the time. 
“When it's busy and you're stressed - you look at the subject 
header and you look at the 'to' box and if you're not in there 
and if you’re not called out in the subject as action - you don't 
look at it.” P6 
“If it's like - a general email to a lot of people - then I'll be like 
'Well do I have time?  Nope - I'll look at it later.” P2 
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6.3 Perceptions of threat vulnerability and 
responsibility 
6.3.1 ‘At work I feel safe’ – Lack of vulnerability 
In order to explore staff feelings around feelings of vulnerability 
we asked the question: ‘Do you feel vulnerable to IS threats?’ 
(Q4A).  The majority of responses indicated surprisingly low 
feelings of vulnerability in response to this question.   
“Umm at work I feel confident. Umm that our technology team 
work very hard.” P5 
“No.  Not in the slightest.”  (Q4A) P13 
“…probably not so much at work... because I'm pretty sure I 
feel like we've got good processes in place at work…”  (Q4A) 
P4 
The few responses that did indicate some degree of vulnerability 
were only offered by staff with high levels of cyber security 
awareness, and were couched in terms of nothing being fully 
secure. 
“Well everything is vulnerable - You never know.” P12 
“So I feel like because I'm aware and I know to speak up about 
it and double check things, that I am quite safe, myself ... umm 
however I guess it always plays in the back of your mind.”  P6 
6.3.2 Information security in home contexts – Far 
more vulnerable, but less to lose 
While we noted a high degree of confidence in the bank’s security 
apparatus generally to protect them from the worst of information 
attacks, (see section 6.3.1), there seemed to be an acute 
consciousness amongst staff interviewed that these defence 
mechanisms were not available at home or on their personal 
devices.   Thus for interview session two we added Q202: ‘So what 
is the difference between thinking about, or IS practices at home 
compared to at work?’  Responses to this question reinforced the 
finding that feelings of vulnerability were higher at home than at 
work. 
“Whereas at home - you're that person that is susceptible to all 
those things - and those safety measures that the organisations 
put in place so therefore you think that much more about it.  Or 
you SHOULD think that much more about it.” P6 
“And personally - umm - outside of work umm <laughs> - not 
so protected!” P5 
“I might be even more conscious because I know that if 
anything goes wrong I'm going to have to sort it out - whereas 
at work if it goes wrong at least we have support networks to 
help us.” P9 
Additionally many participants reported differences in the sense of 
ownership/responsibility of the problem-space compared with at 
work.  This was particularly true for employees who take on a lead 
role in managing IT systems for their household.   
“At home you are tech security - well I am.  <laughs> Whereas 
at work I'm not.” P3 
“I'm forever telling my wife of the latest scam that's happened.” 
P6 
But counter-intuitively, participants often reported more 
permissive and less stringent IS behaviour in the home and 
specifically talked about this in the context of the consequences 
being less important.  This finding is mysterious and requires 
further investigation – specifically operationalising constructs 
around locus of control, vulnerability and threat severity.   
“…but at home there's more risk because I probably don't have 
as strong a firewall.” P7 
“When I'm at home, I'm a bit more loose with my emails but I 
don't click on links.” P10 
6.3.3 Got scammed?  Money was returned so no real 
loss!  Lack of vulnerability 
After investigating feelings of vulnerability, we extended our 
research into the area of perceived consequences of IS breaches. 
After identifying those participants who had experienced an 
episode of cyber fraud, we probed extensively into their 
experiences and reactions (Q5-Q9).  We found that in all cases, 
respondents reported that the fraudulent transactions affecting their 
accounts were reversed by the bank.  In some cases this happened 
quite quickly, while in one case only a partial reimbursement took 
place.  All staff had banking accounts with the financial institution 
in question.  When discussing these events, respondents were 
highly positive about their bank’s response and offered high 
estimations of the bank’s processes in these cases. 
“But <bank name redacted> were brilliant.  Seriously.  Within 
24 hours I think they had replaced the limit and 
<unintelligible> take care of it.  So for me -whatever happens 
after that, doesn't really matter.” P13 
Interviewer: “In your case there was no consequence because 
it was stopped pretty much immediately, is that right?”  
Participant: “Yep.” P18 
This can be seen to equating to the much discussed variable of 
threat severity which has also been discussed extensively as 
contributing (when high) to protective behaviours.   
6.3.4 Security failures equated with loss of trust in 
the bank 
In order to try to understand ideas of loss and the perceptions of 
consequences of poor IS behaviours we asked Q1d (‘Why is 
information security important?’) and then also Q12 (‘What is the 
worst thing that could happen as a result of a phishing attack on 
you?’).  As well as a host of responses detailing specific worst case 
scenarios centred around data loss and fraud, we noticed a repeated 
theme amongst many of the participants who volunteered that one 
of the worst consequences of successful attacks would be the 
reputation of the bank itself.  It would appear that staff are highly 
cognisant of the wider implications data breaches and place a 
consistently high value on the reputation of the bank. 
“…because at the end of the day - it is going to affect the um - 
what is the word I'm looking for - the name of my employer. So 
<bank name redacted> at the end of the day will be affected 
and we don't want it to be named and shamed in any way. So 
the reputation is at risk.” P15 
“We’re a bank, banks are built on trust, if we don’t have the 
trust of our customers, we’re out of business.” P1 
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“And the potential is, if we do it wrong, really badly wrong - 
and we lose that money - it's not a good thing.  And I think 
primarily trust.  Customer trust in us.” P3 
“Because as a bank, we have a very high trust mandate…” P16 
 
6.3.5 Responsibility for security – and identifying 
with the bank 
Since a higher internal locus of control has been shown to be a 
necessary but not sufficient antecedent of engaging protective 
behaviours we operationalised this concept in several questions 
designed to elicit staff attitudes towards who was responsible for 
preventing IS attacks (Q1b, Q1d, Q3).  During the initial analysis 
and iteration process after interview session one, we noted that 
many people talked about this issue quite specifically in relation to 
their perceived identity – as an employee of a bank, so we added 
Q204 (‘So you work for a bank – does that bring with it any special 
responsibilities and roles?’) for interview session two. 
We noted that staff universally offered two primary observations 
about their perceived responsibility for IS.  Firstly – and almost 
always offered as a response to Q1b – people volunteered that they, 
as an individual, were the primary actor and determinant in this 
space. 
“Me as an individual I am primarily responsible for my own 
security…” P14 
“Well I think I'm the primary.” P13 
“It's yourself and anybody who's responsible for public and 
private networks, and the ownership of those.” P18 
“I think it starts with you as a person. But I think everyone is 
involved…” P11 
This assertion of individual responsibility was then almost always 
followed by a secondary consideration – that of a shared 
responsibility with others – primarily the bank – but often 
institutions generally and the collective ideas of the staff at large – 
all seen as powerful outside forces in the equation. 
“So, cybersecurity as a holistic level really comes back to the 
education of everyone.” P16 
“…everybody's! <laughs> Everybody who is involved in the 
network and anybody who's responsible for their own 
approaches <unintelligible> and use of the system.” P18 
“Everyone should be aware of what's happening….” P2 
“Protect my details as much as I can possible, I absolutely 
would take full responsibility for that.  But at the same time I'm 
happy to lean on the bank when things do go pear shaped.” P13 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
Analysis of participant responses revealed a number of novel 
observations as well as confirmed some findings well established 
in the literature. Here we discuss the wider implications of these 
findings on future work in this domain as well as possible real-
world applications to combat cyber-crime. 
7.1 Information, education and knowledge 
sharing. 
Since knowledge of cyber threats has been shown as a necessary 
but not sufficient pre-requisite for users carrying out appropriate 
protective measures [40], the insights established when asking 
about how users receive and participate in information sharing are 
encouraging.  In section 6.1.1 we learnt about how participants’ 
learnt about IS and engaged with a wide variety of sources of 
information.  However, much of this information seemed to not 
comply with basic instructional design principles such as those 
discussed by Kumaraguru et al. [15].  Furthermore when asked 
about where users would go if they had questions, there was much 
uncertainty, suggesting that, in this particular context, more active 
modes of information acquisition should be further facilitated.  In 
particular, this reflects a lack of the basic instructional design 
principles iterated by Kumaraguru et al. where training was most 
likely to be effective when offered at the right time – i.e.: when 
participants were interested in learning or those moments when the 
information is particularly salient.  This distinction between passive 
and active learning raises interesting questions about what 
additional protocols can be developed to meet staff needs and how 
active learning behaviours varies across the population in question. 
In section 6.1.2, we showed that the participants we spoke to were 
not fatigued by regularly scheduled information broadcasts from 
the bank and that these established communications conduits were 
perceived as useful.  More specifically, a behaviour pattern that 
repeatedly presented itself whereby users would scan over periodic 
IS related bulletins, assess what was relevant to them and then 
engage with new material that they deemed relevant to them, 
indicating a nuanced and agentic engagement with these sources of 
information.  This process is also interesting in relation to our 
finding in 6.1.3 where the desired modes of information 
presentation (brief and based on personalised and highly situated 
stories) were both immediately cognitively available to users as 
desirable and quite specific, again reflecting Kumaraguru’s et al. 
[15] instructional design principles of personalisation, contiguity 
and story based agent environment as well as the findings by 
Harbach et al. [45] on the effectiveness of information 
personalisation.  This reinforces the need for increasing the 
bandwidth of existing channels of information to staff by adopting 
principles of brevity and presenting narrative based information 
based on specific user personas.  Furthermore, this supports an 
emerging trend by industry where education efforts are 
personalised for different categories of user in order to increase 
relevance and engagement.   
When asking about information sharing with peers generally 
(section 6.1.4), no consistent pattern of responses occurred, 
however when probing into experiences of cyber-crime 
victimisation, an interesting theme emerged.  Staff with a self-
image of being highly computer–literate and technically ‘savvy’ 
seemed more likely to communicate to others about their negative 
experiences, than those with less certainty about their technical 
skills.  For those with low technical self-efficacy, cognitions around 
victimisation were more centred around the risk of appearing 
foolish or careless if they talked about their experience.  Since an 
oft stated goal of IS culture is to increase normative information 
sharing [46] - from an organisational standpoint this would imply 
that reaching out to those with high levels of confidence in their 
technical abilities may facilitate the development of localised 
‘champions of change’ throughout the organisation.  This approach 
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would extend the work by Sauvik Das et al. in the area of social 
proof, where normative influence was shown to significantly 
increase uptake of additional FB security features.  Furthermore 
this approach specifically suggests avenues to overcome the 
significant challenge for deploying on social proof dynamics where 
engaging in protective technologies is not easily visible to others. 
7.2 Experience of email practices 
While the HCI literature has grappled extensively with the 
phenomena of email processing and problems such as overload [38] 
and interaction patterns such as task switching, interruption lag and 
resumption lag [47], leveraging these findings in order to mitigate 
phishing threats has remained elusive.  However, more recently, 
models emphasizing the attentional aspects of phishing 
victimization have appeared promising.  The Heuristic Systematic 
Model (HSM) with its focus on competing (and interacting) 
shallow and deep information processing mechanisms has been 
shown to predict some degree of phishing victimization.  As such 
our discovery of a number of real-world phenomena present in staff 
email usage that are likely to impact on the application of models 
such as the HSM to the problem may prove useful in future efforts. 
We found evidence of shallow processing of incoming emails when 
people talked about ‘scanning’ their inbox for emails that needed 
an immediate response (section 6.2.1). This reflects Neustadter’s 
behavioural findings of the email triage process [48], such as the 
common tactic of attempting to remove trivial emails in order to 
make it easier to find more important ones.  However, this 
behavioural analysis needs to be extended by a deeper 
understanding of the mental processes involved in order to 
effectively mitigate phishing victimisation.  Models based on 
attentional theories, such as the HSM offer good utility here.  An 
example can be found in Xu’s  [8] exposition of the likelihood of 
elaborative processing in email processing according to personality 
traits such as need for cognition and contextual variables such as 
recipient expertise and recipient involvement (a motivational 
factor).  Based on a similar dual process model, Vishwanath et al. 
[33] showed that most email is processed peripherally and that SE 
was an important factor in users engaging in elaborative processing.  
Furthermore, in findings that extend  the exposition by Neustaeder 
et al. on the email triage process, Floyd  [23] showed that that calls 
to scarcity or urgency cues in phishing emails resulted in higher 
levels of user response owing to the dominance of 
peripheral/shallow processing strategies.   
This understanding of engagement with incoming emails is likely 
to be complicated by our finding of substantial variations in 
workload over time (see section 6.2.3).  Participants asserted that 
the way they process their inbox is qualitatively different 
depending on how heavy their workload is at the time – possibly 
explaining some of the variation in the effectiveness of other known 
predictors of systemic information processing such as desired 
confidence and motivation.  This may also go some way to 
explaining a much discussed phenomena in the security services 
industry around phishing emulations where specific emails that 
have been ‘benchmarked’ according to their effectiveness, for use 
as calibration tools across organisations, nonetheless exhibit a wide 
degree of variance in victimisation rates. 
In addition, we discovered that participants varied substantially in 
their reported numbers of non-relevant emails they received each 
day (see section 6.2.2).  This reinforces the relevance of the  
assertion by Parson et al. [49] that the categories of emails that  user 
needs to process may have a profound effect on the mental 
processes involved and leads to a great deal of uncertainty in terms 
of experimental design.  It further complicates Neustaedter’s et al. 
[48] taxonomy of low, medium and high volume users and suggests 
another variable that may need to be accounted for to explain 
processing approaches.  At the very least, the proportion of non-
relevant/trivial emails is likely to effect the mental efforts devoted 
to evaluating each email – and if high levels of non-relevant emails 
results in shallow processing, may result in increased victimisation 
as users devote less elaborative processing to evaluating the 
characteristics of each email.  This variable should be 
operationalised and tested in further attentional-based experiments 
into phishing victimisation. 
7.3 Perceptions of threat, vulnerability and 
responsibility 
 
Vulnerability and threat severity. 
We found participants consistently talked about feeling ‘safe’ and 
‘protected’ within the information infrastructure of the bank – and 
tied these feelings firmly to the perceived emphasis and obvious 
presence of IS protocols, practices and information in their 
workplace.  An anecdote related to us by a bank security worker 
involved a staff member who noticed a suspicious email they 
received in their personal email account at home, and had 
immediately forwarded it to their professional email address in 
order to open it at work – rationalising this as the safest thing to do 
since the security environment at work was ‘safer’ than that which 
they had access to at home. 
These low feelings of vulnerability owing to the perceived presence 
and visibility of IS practices suggests itself as an important finding 
since it ties in with the literature around risk homeostasis.  This 
theory suggests that in situations of risk, where controls are 
implemented to mitigate the risk or the severity of the outcomes, 
people often either decrease their protective behaviours, or increase 
risky behaviours in order to subconsciously return to the same level 
of risk as before the mitigation was put in place [50].  This effect 
has been seen in examples such as anti-locking brakes, where 
drivers, once aware of the effect of the new braking system on 
stopping distance, modified their behaviour to drive closer to cars 
in front of them – returning the risk to subjectively the same levels 
as before the application of the protective technology - the anti-
locking brakes [51].  An emerging design response to this dynamic 
has been increasing the subjective feelings of risk and vulnerability 
in order to encourage users to engage in protective behaviours.  
This has been implemented in domains as far flung as traffic 
calming designs to aviation systems [52]. This has immediately 
actionable implications for staff education in that according to all 
of the models that include the concept of vulnerability, emphasising 
this variable in educational efforts is likely to increase protective 
behaviours deployed by staff. On the other hand, whether this 
mitigation approach is palatable to organisations’ internal 
communication values is debatable. 
When asked about the difference between practices at home and at 
work (section 6.3.2) we found indications that perceptions of 
vulnerability were higher at home than at work while threat severity 
was lower at home than at work.  These assertions were specifically 
linked to the perception that at home breaches would be centred 
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around personal loss, but at work would also potentially damage 
the bank as well.   
This understanding of threat severity related to the bank itself was 
also evident in responses to questions in section 6.3.4 where staff 
placed a heavy emphasis on the consequences to the reputation and 
trust of the bank by its clients should it experience a major security 
breach.   
Again, models based in the cognitive literature have been shown to 
explicate such findings as well as offer avenues for mitigation. 
Boss’s deployment of PMT in a study of virus alert warning 
messages, showed that perceived threat severity predicts fear, 
which in turn increases (in the described study by double) the 
perception of the necessity of taking protective measures.  On the 
other hand, this particular variable is contentious as a predictor 
since Hanus et al. [17] found that that it was not a signification 
predictor of security behaviour.   
This variance in evidence may be explained by a central dynamic 
of both the PMT and HBT where they predict that threat severity 
will only increase protective measures when SE is high.  I.e.: 
regardless of how motivated people are to protect themselves, they 
will not do so if they believe that are not capable of carrying out the 
necessary actions to protect themselves. 
We found that participants often exhibited very little fear about 
monetary loss in response to cyber attacks.  This was evident in a 
large number of responses where participants detailed being the 
victim of cyber-fraud, but with the final outcome of their money 
being replaced by the bank – sometimes very quickly.  This notion 
is also supported by repeated assertions about faith in the bank to 
replace lost funds should something go awry. 
Furthermore, several participants, when discussing their own fraud 
victimisation, repeatedly used the term reduced ‘limit’ to describe 
the outcome of the event and did not seem to perceive that attack 
as actually involving any monetary loss.  This would suggest that 
people see losses charged to a credit card as qualitatively different 
and of far less consequence than that of losses to a savings type 
account. 
These two phenomena together may help explain Yu’s [35] finding 
that victimisation experience significantly increased subsequent 
fear of cybercrime for cyber bullying, digital piracy and computer 
viruses – but not for on-line scams. 
Locus of Control and responsibility 
Staff perceptions around responsibility are particularly interesting 
where while the primary assertion of responsibility was expressed 
as lying with the individual, it was then immediately qualified by 
equally strong assertions of a more collective and dispersed 
responsibility.  While the existent HCI literature does not seem to 
have engaged with the variable of Locus of Control (LOC) directly, 
it has been shown, within cognitive studies, to be an important 
predictor of people engaging in protective activities [53]. 
However LOC is a complicated construct.  Walston showed 
evidence that it is not a unidimensional continuum but rather two 
independent constructs [54], and since then a number of researchers 
have attempted to tease out the proposed multi-dimensional space 
at the nexus of what has been variously called: Self Efficacy, 
Perceived behavioural control, Locus of Control and Locus of 
Responsibility [55].   
After Rotter’s [56] original formulation of the Locus of Control, 
Levenson [57] extended the model by proposing three subscales: 
internality, control by powerful others and control by chance.  
These variables suggest themselves as being particularly apt to this 
context since staff seem to put much stock in the presence of 
existing security systems and protocols – implying awareness of the 
presence of powerful others.   
This is however complicated by the fact that in Levenson’s [57] 
formulation, the presence of powerful others are more likely to be 
considered agentic in the outcome in question, whereas in our 
context the presence of powerful others, in the form of effective 
security systems of the bank, suggests an attribution of less 
likelihood of the reinforcement – i.e.: falling victim to phishing.   
There may also be reason to entertain Terpstra’s [58] distinction 
between moral and actionable responsibility. We saw responses 
where participants discriminated between taking personal 
responsibility for engaging protective behaviours, but then relying 
on the bank to provide technical and material assistance. This 
suggests that there is some perceived distinction made between the 
roles of the individual and the bank that may correspond to 
individual actions being seen as a moral responsibility, but 
organisational responses as more agentic and actionable. 
A further argument for the importance of outcome attribution is 
presented by Jeuring et al. [59], who deployed an additional 
variable of Locus of Responsibility (LoR) and showed that internal 
LoR is associated with higher engagement of coping strategies, but 
only if it is also accompanied by a perception that the person has 
the necessary resources to mitigate the risk, ie: Self-efficacy. 
8. LIMITATIONS 
This research, being qualitative, resulted in a number of findings 
that should be considered not as generalised facts, but rather 
understandings of processes, in a particular context of a particular 
group of people in a particular industry.  While the nature of this 
knowledge is richer and deeper than that typically resulting from 
more quantitative approaches, questions of generalisability remain 
to be addressed by further more quantitative and larger-n work as 
discussed below [60]. 
Furthermore, since our study took place within a specific socio-
technical system, i.e.: a large bank in Australia and New Zealand, 
it remains to be seen as to how inter-organisational and inter-
cultural differences may affect these findings.  Specifically 
cognitions around punishment for maleficence and IS policies 
generally are likely to vary from institution to institution and ideas 
around sharing information and identity may vary across cultures. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
Our study resulted in a number of findings that suggest both 
avenues for future research and intriguing hypotheses to test.  We 
present here a summary of our work related back to the original 
research questions provided at the outset of this paper. 
What cognitive variables may be implicated in staff’s 
behaviour in relation to phishing emails? 
We found that self-efficacy may well be a strong determinant of 
staff sharing stories of negative experiences.  This is owing to those 
staff with a self-image of being less technically literate being 
embarrassed to admit victimisation while those who saw 
themselves as technically competent felt motivated to share their 
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stories to prevent victimisation of their peers.  In terms of 
perceptions of threat and vulnerability, we found a noteworthy lack 
of perceived vulnerability when within the bank’s IT systems that 
were associated with impressions of confidence in the bank’s 
visible and highly estimated security protocols.  Low perceptions 
of vulnerability within bank networks were often accompanied by 
stories of falling victim to identity theft but where financial loss 
was quickly mitigated by the bank – leading to a postulated low 
threat severity attribution specifically for financial victimisation.   
How do staff experience information security within the 
organisation and how does this differ from their perceptions at 
home? 
We found that mitigating IS risks was perceived as a shared 
responsibility between the individual and the wider bank security 
systems.  Staff conceptions around security breaches were heavily 
centred around cognitions of subsequent loss of trust in the bank by 
the public and was seen as an important and central issue for 
employees.  In contrast to the above finding about low feelings of 
vulnerability within the banks networks, we found different 
perceptions around on-line experiences at home where participants 
felt more vulnerable, but where a wide range of perceptions around 
threat severity was found. 
What environmental and organisational factors affect staff 
behaviour in relation to phishing attacks and information 
security more generally? 
We found that in relation to education, the existing informational 
channels seemed to be functioning and well received.  However 
there was opportunity to capitalise on staff self-motivation by 
providing more avenues for active learning and that participants 
expressed a clear preference for information presented in brief 
stories centred around personalised experiences and work contexts.  
In relation to email practices, we found that some staff receive far 
more emails than others and that there appears to be much variance 
in the proportion of non-relevant, or trivial emails that staff receive 
on a day to day basis which has implications for attentional models 
of information processing in relation to phishing victimisation.  
Workload was also found to vary significantly over time for some 
staff, and that this was associated with perceived differences in 
practices around scanning and responding to incoming messages.   
10. FUTURE WORK 
The research presented here describes a number of novel 
observations pertaining to banking staff cognitions around and 
experiences of IS.  While these findings suggest further 
investigation, we mention three of the more promising avenues for 
further research below.  
Our finding that staff with a self-image of computer competence 
and being technically ‘savvy’ are more likely to communicate to 
others about their negative experiences (section 6.1.4) should be 
investigated further.  Understanding what factors preclude people 
from discussing and sharing information about phishing 
victimisation holds promise for creating organisational cultures 
with increased normative influence on staff about the correct 
protective behaviours to deploy. 
Our finding in relation to variance in the number of non-relevant 
emails staff encounter in their inbox may have important 
implications for attentional based and dual process theories of 
phishing victimisation. This variable should be deployed in future 
work employing theories such as the Heuristic Systematic Model 
to predict elaborative processing of incoming emails. 
Perhaps most interestingly, our findings of low feelings of 
vulnerability associated with visible organisational security 
protocols suggests an important avenue for staff education efforts.  
Manipulating vulnerability in messaging and then validating via 
behavioural responses may increase protective measures as 
predicted by risk homeostasis theory. 
On a more general note, we suggest that modes of investigation that 
consider and deploy cognitive variables are likely to be of 
considerable benefit to the HCI and CSCW communities.  
Specifically attacks based around social engineering require an 
understanding of the mental processes that result in victimisation, 
and in the context of phishing, the factors that lead to elaborative 
processing; i.e.: users actually deploying the knowledge that they 
have to evaluate threats.  We argue that models based on the 
fundamental mental constructs that drive behaviour are likely to be 
increasingly useful in combatting the ever-increasing sophistication 
of on-line threats and hold promise to transform users from a 
system weakness to an active line of defence. 
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APPENDIX 
A. COMPLETE INSTRUMENT 
 
Topic: Knowledge 
Q1  What do you know about cyber security? 
Q1-A What do you think it is? 
Q1-B Who is involved? 
Q1-C Is it important?  
Q1-D Why is it important? 
Topic: Attitudes 
Q2 What is your role at <bank name redacted>? 
Q3 How does Cyber Security affect you?  
Q4 How do you feel about Cyber Security?  
Q4A Do you feel vulnerable to cyber security threats? 
Q4B Do you feel fear about Cyber Security? 
Topic: History 
Q5 What’s your experience with Cyber Security historically? 
Q5A What kind of stories have you heard? 
Q6 Have you ever clicked on something dodgy? What happened? 
Q7 Have you clicked on a phishing email? What happened? 
Q7A How severe was it? 
Q8 Did that make you change your behaviour? 
Q9 How did that make you feel? 
Q10 Did you tell anyone about it? 
Q11 Has it happened again since? 
Q12 What do you think is the worst thing that could happen as a 
result of a phishing attack on you? 
Topic: Practices 
Q13 How do you manage passwords? 
Q14 Do you connect to free Wi-Fi? 
Q15 What makes you suspicious of an email? Discuss. 
Q16 How do you deal with emails you are suspicious of? 
Q17 Is it getting hard to tell what is suspicious? 
Q18 Where do you learn or hear about this stuff?  
Q19 Whom do you trust for advice or information on Cyber 
Security? 
Q20 Do you follow their advice?  
Q21 Do you think there is enough training/information provided at 
your work? 
Q22 Would you like to learn more?  
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Q23 How would like this training/information to be provided? 
(prompt:  video, podcasts, intranet pages, workshops, induction?)  
Q24 Roughly how many emails would you receive in an average 
work day? 
Topic: Contexts 
Q25 Roughly how many emails would you send in an average 
work day? 
Q26 How do you feel about your email practices (is it too much, 
stressful)? 
Q27 In your email practice, do you tend to; 
Check/Notifications/Batch 
Q28 How busy do you feel at work? Do you feel you have enough 
time in your day to devote to each task you need to do? 
Q29 How stressed do you feel at work on an average day? 
Q30 Are there any consequences at <bank named redacted> for 
poor security behaviour? 
Q31 Colleagues: 
Q31A Do you talk about cyber-security issues? 
Q31B Have you learnt things from them? 
Q31C Do they seem to care about cyber security? 
Q32 Bosses: 
Q32A Do they talk about cyber-security issues? 
Q32B Have you learnt things from them? 
Q32C Do they seem to care about cyber security? 
Topic: Identity 
Q33 Do you see yourself as being good with computers? 
Q34 Are you confident with your use of the internet?  
Q35 Do you think you can recognise dodgy emails? 
Q36 Do you teach or tell other people about Cyber security 
matters? 
Q37 Whose responsibility is it to prevent Cyber Security attacks?  
Q38 Is it important to you to be able to recognise dodgy emails? 
Topic: Iterated – Round two interviews only 
Q201 So does the way you scan your inbox change according 
to how busy you are?  And if so how? 
Q202 So what is the difference between thinking about, or 
cyber security practices at home compared to at work? 
Q203 So how much does your workload and the pace of your 
workplace vary over time?   
Q204 So you work for a bank – does that bring with it any 
special responsibilities and roles? 
Q205 Do you know who the cyber security team are the bank?  
Or how to find them or contact them? 
Q206 Do you think the Cyber-security team are good at what 
they do? 
Q207 Do you get a lot of emails that aren’t really relevant to 
you?  Or are trivial? 
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